

49

SECRET  
USMC/16

E12

SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 21, 1962  
Time: 8:30 P.M.  
Place: Hotel Richemond

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Hillenbrand

United States

Lord Home, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Samuel  
Mr. Tomkins

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder  
Dr. Carstens  
Mr. Krapf  
Mr. Reinkemeyer

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
M. Baraduc  
M. Roux  
M. Durand

Subject: Berlin

Copies to:

G  
S/S  
S/P  
S/S  
EUR - 2  
INR/D  
SOV  
GHR-2  
Ambassy Bonn  
Ambassy PARIS/USRO  
Ambassy LONDON  
Ambassy MOSCOW  
US Mission Berlin

Couve, who had seen Gromyko for more than an hour before the Secretary, began by reporting his impressions. After a discussion of Leningrad which he described as not important, Couve said Gromyko raised the subject of Germany and Berlin. He attacked France for the closeness of her relations with the Federal Republic, marking back to the Franco-Russian Alliance after World War I. Couve said he responded by pointing out that this was not a useful segment of past history, which also included 1938-1939. French national interests in good relations with the Federal Republic were not

contrary

DECLASSIFIED  
SECRET  
FILED  
AUG 15 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR  
(U) RELEASE (U) DECLASSIFY  
(U) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) DENY  
( ) DELETE  
( ) Non-sequitur info.

REVIEWED BY  
Date June 26, 1991  
TS authority to:  
OADR  
( ) CLASSIFY  
( ) DOWNGRADE ISIC ( ) S/C ( ) C OADR

2

110.11-100/12102

762.00

4

SECRET

- 3 -

their proposals on access. The Secretary had made clear that, since these were connected with the removal of Western forces from Berlin, there was no point in pursuing the subject. If Western force removal could be left aside, we could then talk further about a Four-Power body for access, adding certain control functions to arbitration and eliminating any veto. As far as the Soviet claim of respect for GDR sovereignty was concerned, the Secretary noted that the Soviets had never responded to the suggestion that with respect to access we were not trying to interfere with GDR sovereignty but merely requiring that the GDR not interfere with our access.

Lord Home said he felt the line which the Secretary had been taking was right under the circumstances. However, he noted, we had never specifically told the Soviets that, if they accepted Western troops in Berlin and continuation of the occupation, there would be a number of other points on which they could count, for example, having permanent Soviet troops stationed at the War Memorial in West Berlin and having the Western Powers calling their troops "Police Forces". This might help to save Soviet face.

The Secretary noted that rumors were circulating around Geneva that Gromyko would bring forward some new proposals on Tuesday. The Secretary's present intention was still to leave Geneva on Wednesday to keep his Washington appointments.

Home asked whether the Secretary had received the impression that, if we reiterated the points in the U.S. "principles paper", this would save Gromyko's face. The Secretary said this did not appear in anything said today. His impression was that the Soviets were trying to get the highest price on the troop issue by threatening to sign a peace treaty. They might be trying to find out if they could get anything from us by further negotiations. If they concluded in the negative, a number of alternatives were open to them. We were not sure the Soviets had made a final choice between these. The Secretary then mentioned various possibilities in connection with the peace treaty ranging from a Bois-Zorin type of treaty to the most radical devolution of power to the GDR over Allied access. We had tried to make every effort to clarify that, when all the arguments are put aside, what counts is that we are in West Berlin by right and are not going to be pushed out. This is a fact the Soviets must live with. If they start with this, other things can be worked out. If not, there will be trouble.

Home observed

031155000000  
SECRET  
 001155000000

~~SECRET~~

UEMC/16

~~SECRET~~

Have observed that, if the Soviets were to drop their demands, they would require some face-saving in order to justify their letting the situation lie, for example, having a contingent of troops in West Berlin. The Secretary said our "principles paper" was intended to get into discussions over time. The Soviets could, of course, say to us privately that they would sign their peace treaty but we would not need to mobilize. We did not have the impression they are now prepared to tell us that our proposed modus vivendi is what they are looking for.

The Secretary and Howe noted there were no signs of Soviet military or diplomatic activity indicating they were moving towards an early peace treaty. However, the Secretary added, they might sign an attenuated peace treaty, but we felt it unlikely that they would commit themselves completely to Ulbricht. Coove noted that Gromyko had not said what the results of signing a peace treaty would be. The Secretary commented that Gromyko did not want to indicate this clearly at this point. It might be worth trying to find out more as to what respect for the sovereignty of the GDR involved. Coove said this in part meant giving the GDR control of our communications. The Secretary recalled an early Thompson-Gromyko exchange in which the latter had responded to a statement that we cannot recognize the GDR by saying that we already did. However, he had not returned to this formulation. The Secretary also noted that the Soviets in general have used more severe language on Berlin with other people than with us directly. In fact, Gromyko had been relatively mild until he pulled out a paper and read prepared remarks.

The Secretary responded in negative to Howe's query as to whether there had been any hints of a Soviet desire for a summit meeting. However, the Secretary said, he had the impression Gromyko had come to Geneva in the hope of working out a general agreement which could then be signed at the summit. He had the impression the Soviets were looking forward to an eventual summit.

The discussion concluded with consideration of guidance to press officers. There was agreement that the Western comment should be restrained and limited to stressing that the meeting today was part of a continuing process of discussion.

USDEL:MPH/llambert:all  
7/24/62

~~SECRET~~

03115507030